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DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
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CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): (U) THIRD MEETING OF THE START FOLLOW-ON CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION AND NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009

REF: A. STATE 99070-99072 (SFO-V-GUIDANCE-003: U.S.-PROPOSED DRAFT START FOLLOW-ON ELIMINATION PROTOCOL)
¶B. GENEVA 00811 (SFO-GVA-V-024)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-027.

¶2. (U) Meeting Date: September 29, 2009
Time: 10:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

¶3. (S) The third meeting of the Conversion or Elimination Working Group (C or E) WG was held at the Russian Mission on September 29, 2009. The U.S. chair provided charts outlining differences on elimination between START I, U.S.-proposed text for the START Follow-on Elimination Notification (Ref A), and Russian-proposed text on elimination (Ref B), unofficial Russian translation of the U.S. Elimination Protocol.

¶4. (S) The U.S. side explained that the sides continue to have different philosophies on how to conduct elimination activities--the Russian side favors less specificity in actual procedures than does the United States. The U.S. side

noted the importance of ensuring verification of those actions. The Russian delegation raised the issue of financial costs involved in eliminating systems, but also recommended the United States spend whatever is necessary to ensure we use unambiguous methods. The Russian side also continued to object to what they perceive to be special U.S. interest in mobile missile elimination verification.

¶5. (S) The U.S. side noted that we likely have more in common than the different sizes (lengths) of the respective U.S. and Russian proposals would suggest. Many key phrases used are similar. The U.S. proposal goes into greater detail, but the concepts are quite similar.

OPENING SALVOS

¶6. (S) Both sides began the third meeting of the C or E WG by noting each side had reviewed the other's respective proposals and were prepared to ask questions. Mr. Elliott suggested that the respective Parties' positions may not be as different as some might think. Elliott handed over charts outlining the differences between START, U.S.- and Russian-proposed C or E procedures.

¶7. (S) The following text was handed over to the Russian delegation; however, it was not discussed during this meeting. Each charts' four columns were Column One: Item, Column Two: START, Column Three: U.S. SFO and Column Four: Russian SFO.

Begin Text:

Slide One, Column One:

Elimination of Heavy Bomber for Nuclear Armaments.

Slide One, Column Two:

All of the following:

(a) The tail section with tail surfaces shall be severed from the fuselage at a location obviously not an assembly joint;

(b) The wings shall be separated from the fuselage at any location by any method; and

(c) The remainder of the fuselage shall be severed into two pieces, within the area of attachment of the wings to the fuselage, at a location obviously not an assembly joint. To convert a heavy bomber so that it is no longer equipped for nuclear armaments, all weapons bays equipped to carry nuclear armaments shall be modified so as to render them incapable of carrying nuclear armaments. All external attachment joints for nuclear armaments and all external attachment joints for pylons for nuclear armaments shall be removed or modified so as to render them incapable of carrying nuclear armaments;

Verification by NTM and inspection.

Slide One, Column Three:

Any of the following:

(a) The tail section with tail surfaces shall be separated from the fuselage at a location that is obviously not an assembly joint using any method;

(b) All weapons bays and all external attachment areas for pylons shall be modified as to render them incapable of employing nuclear armaments;

(c) All internal and external launcher assemblies shall be

modified so as to render them incapable of employing nuclear armaments; or

(d) Other procedures, developed by the possessing Party, that render the heavy bomber incapable of being utilized for its original purpose in a manner that the other Party can confirm, shall be recorded within the framework of the BCC.

Prior to the elimination of the first heavy bomber of each type...conduct a one-time demonstration.

Verification by NTM and inspection

Slide One, Column Four:

Elimination of heavy bombers shall be carried out using procedures to be determined by the Party conducting the elimination, which provide for removal or destruction of the

basic design elements and which ensure that a heavy bomber is rendered inoperable.

Conversion of heavy bombers shall be carried out in such a way that the converted heavy bombers have external or functional differences indicating that they cannot perform functions involving the armaments with which they were equipped prior to conversion.

Verification by NTM and Visit

Slide Two, Column One:

Elimination of Silo Launchers of ICBMs

Slide Two, Column Two:

All of the following:

(a) The silo door shall be removed, dismantled, or destroyed and the silo headworks and the silo shall be destroyed by excavation to a depth of no less than eight meters, or by explosion to a depth of no less than six meters; and

(b) Following completion of the procedures provided for in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, the silo may be filled to the level of the bottom of the hole created by the excavation or explosion...the resultant hole may be graded during the 180-day period...but not filled with earth until expiration of the 90-day period.

Conversion from one accountable type to another accountable type.

Verification by NTM/Notification

Slide Two, Column Three:

Any of the following:

(a) The silo door shall be removed, dismantled, or destroyed and the silo headworks and the silo shall be destroyed by excavation to a depth of no less than eight meters, or by explosion to a depth of no less than six meters;

(b) The silo door shall be removed, dismantled or destroyed and the silo shall be completely filled with gravel. The silo door shall not be reinstalled; or

(c) Other procedures, developed by the possessing Party, that render the silo launcher incapable of being utilized for its original purpose in a manner that the other Party can confirm, shall be recorded within the framework of the BCC.

Prior to the elimination of the first launcher of each type of ICBMs using procedures provided for in subparagraph 5(c), possessing Party shall conduct a one-time demonstration.

For a nuclear-capable to nuclear-capable conversion, only a notification is required.

Verification by NTM and inspection

Slide Two, Column Four:

Elimination of ICBM launchers shall be carried out using procedures to be determined by the Party conducting the elimination, which provide for rendering them incapable of launching ICBMs.

Conversion of ICBM launchers shall be carried out in such a way that the converted launchers cannot thereafter contain ICBMs of the type for which they were intended prior to conversion and that they have external or functional differences.

Verification by visit and NTM

Slide Three, Column One:

Elimination of Mobile Launchers of ICBMs

Slide Three, Column Two and Column Three:

Elimination process for mobile launchers of ICBMs and mobile training launchers:

(a) The erector launcher mechanism and leveling supports shall be removed from the launcher chassis;

(b) The framework of the erector launcher mechanism on which the ICBM is mounted and erected shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) Missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from the launcher chassis;

(d) The mountings of the erector launcher mechanism and of the launcher leveling supports shall be cut off the launcher chassis and each such mounting shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(e) A portion of the self-propelled launcher chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle and that portion shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and no component, including those removed in accordance with the procedures provided for in this paragraph, shall be mounted, welded, or attached by any other means to an eliminated launcher chassis so as to increase the length of such a chassis.

Upon completion of these elimination procedures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the vehicle may be used only for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty.

Verification by inspection.

Slide Three, Column Four:

Elimination of ICBM launchers shall be carried out using procedures to be determined by the Party conducting the

elimination, which provide for rendering them incapable of launching ICBMs.

Verification by NTM and visit.

Slide Four, Column One:

Elimination of SLBM Launchers

NOTE: There are no conversion procedures for SLBM launchers in the START C or E Protocol.

Slide Four, Column Two:

Any of the following:

(a) The missile section shall be removed from the submarine;

(b) The missile launch tube(s), and all elements of their reinforcement, including hull liners and segments of circular structural members between the missile launch tubes, as well as the entire portion of the pressure hull, the entire portion of the outer hull, and the entire portion of the superstructure through which all the missile launch tubes pass and that contain all the missile launch-tube penetrations shall be removed from the submarine. Missile launch tube(s) that have been removed shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size and shall remain in the open in the vicinity of the submarine until completion of the elimination procedures, after which they may be removed from the elimination facility;

Verification by NTM

Slide Four, Column Three:

Any of the following:

(a) As in START

(b) As in START

(c) The launchers height or diameter shall be reduced in a manner such that the launcher can no longer contain the smallest SLBM deployed by the possessing Party;

(d) Critical components required to launch an SLBM that can be confirmed by the inspecting party, shall be removed. Such critical components may include but are not limited to gas generator(s) and related launcher sub-systems; or

(e) Other procedures, developed by the possessing Party, that render the SLBM launcher incapable of being utilized for its original purpose in a manner that the other Party can confirm, shall be recorded within the framework of the BCC.

Prior to the elimination of the first launcher of each type of SLBM launcher using procedures provided for in subparagraph 5(c), 5(d), and 5(e), the possessing Party will conduct a one-time demonstration.

For a nuclear-capable to nuclear-capable conversion, only a

notification is required.
Verification by NTM and inspection

Slide Four, Column Four:

Elimination of SLBM launchers shall be carried out using procedures to be determined by the Party conducting the elimination, which provide, inter alia and which ensure that the SLBM launchers being eliminated are rendered incapable of launching SLBMs.

Conversion of SLBM launchers shall be carried out in such a way that the converted launchers cannot thereafter contain SLBMs of the type for which they were intended prior to conversion and that they have external or functional differences.

Verification by NTM and visit.

Slide Five, Column One:

Elimination of ICBMs for Silo Launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs

NOTE: There are no elimination procedures for ICBMs and SLBMs in the START C or E Protocol

Slide Five, Column Two:

Treaty Article III Paragraph 7

ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated by rendering them inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose, using procedures at the discretion of the Party possessing the ICBMs or SLBMs.

Notification

Slide Five, Column Three:

Treaty Article III Paragraph 7

ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated by rendering them inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose, using procedures at the discretion of the Party possessing the ICBMs or SLBMs, or otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol or as agreed between the Parties within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

Notification

Slide Five, Column Four:

Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be carried out using procedures to be determined by the Party conducting the elimination, which ensure that they are rendered inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose.

Verification by NTM for solid-propellant ICBMs and SLBMs

Slide Six, Column One:

Elimination of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs

Slide Six, Column Two and Column Three:

Prior to the confirmatory inspection :

(a) shall remove the missile's reentry vehicle or vehicles;

(b) may remove the electronic and electromechanical devices of the missile's guidance and control system from the missile and its launch canister;

(c) may remove the missile from its launch canister, remove the missile attachment devices from the launch canister, disassemble the missile into stages and the self-contained dispensing mechanism, and detach rocket motor nozzles and interstage skirts of the missile from stages;

(d) may remove propellant from stages;

(e) may remove or actuate auxiliary pyrotechnic devices installed on the missile and its launch canister;

(f) may remove penetration aids, including devices for their attachment and release;

Elimination process for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs:

(a) If solid fuel has not been removed from stages, the stages shall be destroyed by explosive demolition or burned;

(b) Rocket motor nozzles and cases, as well as the interstage skirts of a missile remaining after completion of the procedures provided for in subparagraphs 2(c), 2(d) and 4(a) of this Section, or after the completion of static testing provided for in paragraph 3 of Section VI of this Protocol, shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) The self-contained dispensing mechanism, as well as the front section, including the reentry vehicle platform and the front section shroud, shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, or destroyed by explosion.

¶5. Elimination process for launch canisters of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs:

(a) The body of the launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, or destroyed by explosion; or

(b) If the body of the launch canister is composed of segments, each of the segments shall be cut into two pieces at a location that is not an assembly joint. A launch canister, the body of which is of unitary construction, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, or cut into three pieces in such a manner that pieces no less than 1.5 meters long are cut from the ends of the body of such a

launch canister.

Verification by inspection

Slide Six, Column Four:

Elimination of ICBM launchers shall be carried out using procedures to be determined by the Party conducting the elimination, which provide for rendering them incapable of launching ICBMs.

Verification by NTM and visit

End Text.

¶8. (S) Ryzhkov suggested that the two parties have fundamentally different approaches. Ryzhkov noted that to Russia, elimination means the launchers and facilities can no longer be used for its intended purposes and would no longer be subject to the treaty. Conversion means the items can no longer be used for its intended purpose but remain subject to the terms of the treaty.

HEAVY BOMBERS AND DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB

¶9. (S) Elliott asked whether converted items would no longer be subject to numerical limits, but would be subject to verification. Ryzhkov said yes. Elliott asked whether this would apply to the category of former heavy bombers? Does converting bombers to a non-nuclear configuration make them former heavy bombers? Ryzhkov demurred, not using the term former heavy bomber, saying instead that they would be heavy bombers converted to a non-nuclear configuration. He went on to say conversion procedures could also be used to convert them back, and visits to confirm that this had not happened would be an important aspect of the protocol. Elliott then asked how Russia would treat non-flyable B-52 bombers at Davis Monthan. Ryzhkov answered that any heavy bomber is subject to the treaty until the moment it has been eliminated. Elliott noted the importance of agreeing in the appropriate treaty article the existing types of heavy bombers, and by doing so, determine the status of B-52Gs. Ryzhkov responded, saying he wasn't speaking of counting

rules, but rather of including heavy bombers in reporting data as non-deployed items.

RUSSIAN DELEGATION EXPLAINED THEIR APPROACH

¶10. (S) Rzyhkov elaborated on the approach used by the Russian Delegation in developing their proposed conversion and elimination annex. He relayed that there were three aspects used throughout their annex: 1) the fundamental principle of rendering an item inoperable for its intended purpose is applied across all strategic offensive arms (SOA); 2) harmonization, in that the same procedures would be used for the same types of SOA; and 3) simplification in that both parties should not be limited to a specific list of procedures.

RUSSIA: ICBMS AND SLBMS

¶11. (S) Ryzhkov then moved the discussion to ICBMs and SLBMs stating that Russia advocated flexibility in determining what method to use to eliminate SOAs. Ryzhkov regularly emphasized the similarities of U.S and Russian ICBMs and SLBMs such as each have solid-propellant fuel and number of stages. Ryzhkov made the point that if each party's solid-propellant ballistic missiles are the same then the elimination procedures for both Parties should also be the same. Additionally, each party should be allowed to select their own methods, preferably simplified procedures, deleting those START I methods now considered to be unnecessary. For example, Ryzhkov inquired as to why specify filling silos with gravel? He said that gravel can be expensive in certain parts of Russia, so why not use soil? Rzyhkov asserted that a Party selecting their own procedures would give Russia the flexibility to do eliminations economically.

¶12. (S) Elliott responded by expressing an understanding of their position, and suggested some procedures could be developed now, and some later, with the important principle being one of successfully removing the item from accountability. Ryzhkov responded by saying if the respective Party gets to select its own procedure, then we are in agreement. Some procedures should be mandatory, for example, removal of the silo door, and some should be at the discretion of the Party, such as soil versus gravel, and when decided upon by the eliminating Party, informing the other Party of the method used, and perhaps discussed in the BCC. Elliott suggested the list of examples could be expanded, any of which would be acceptable. Ryzhkov said the U.S.-proposed text as written doesn't come across that way, it says the Parties must agree to procedures. Elliott suggested that the Parties consider having a list of elimination methods. Ryzhkov questioned the need for a list. Elliott said that appropriate level of Protocol detail and specific procedures are important for the U.S. ratification process.

I'M GLAD YOU ASKED ME THAT QUESTION

¶13. (S) Ryzhkov asked why the United States insisted on requiring mobile ICBMs such as the Russian SS-25 to have different elimination procedures than the U.S. Minuteman III? Elliott highlighted that the original intent was to create a treaty to follow the START Treaty with a degree of certainty and transparency for both sides. It was not to discriminate against one side or the other side. However, due to the characteristics of the mobile missiles these items raise verification challenges. NTM can verify the elimination of ICBM silos and SLBM submarines. Elliott maintained that the intent is not to discriminate between U.S. and Russian weapon systems, but to verify the elimination of systems that, due

to their differences, have different verification requirements,regardless of which Party possesses them.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF OPTIONS TO DUMA RATIFICATION
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¶14. (S) After a break, Ryzhkov returned to the importance of Russia having the flexibility to choose elimination methods, expressing a concern that if specific elimination procedures that are different for each Party are mandated, it may be difficult to ratify the treaty. He also spoke of using three levels of text in the treaty (treaty articles, protocols, and annexes). Elliott noted the possibility of using three levels of text was being discussed in the Inspection Protocol Working Group but it required further analysis for its applicability for this working group.

¶15. (S) Elliott then introduced the subject of demonstrations, using them as a confidence building measure that would also contribute to verification. Ryzhkov said it could be problematic, as with the conversion of a heavy bomber to a non-nuclear configuration. He asserted that eliminations should be no problem. Ryzhkov said that conversion and demonstration should be aimed at confirming the heavy bomber was converted to another kind of SOA. For example, when one side opts to use the changing of electrical cables to accomplish a conversion, the other side will have a lot of problems confirming the conversion. The Parties should use procedures, regardless of cost, to accomplish convincing the other Party that the conversion has been completed. Elliott agreed--the same applies for mobile missiles. Mr. Smirnov noted the Russian preference for NTM, not inspections. He asked why the United States needed inspectors to observe the process of elimination and why does the United States want to retain the detailed elimination provisions for mobile missiles? Elliot said that for some systems like a silo launcher of ICBMs or submarine, NTM will work, however, for other, smaller systems it won't work. One possibility for smaller systems is an exhibition demonstration when the elimination is complete. Elliott noted that the United States was trying to keep things simple too, as in the case of B-52s, simply cutting off the tail.

¶16. (S) Elliott asked what the Russian delegation envisions as the basic design elements of heavy bombers? Rzyhkov pointed out that the tail, wings or fuselage of the aircraft can all be characterized as basic design elements of heavy bombers. Smironov interjected that both the United States and Russia had the same basic text but must bear in mind a set of procedures to be selected.

THE NEXT STEP

¶17. (S) Elliott provided Ryzhkov with a U.S.-Proposed joint draft text on the Elimination Protocol in both U.S. and Russian languages, suggesting both Parties find common language. Ryzhkov recommended the U.S. delegation study the Russian proposal, suggest changes, and that the Russian delegation would do the same for the U.S. version.

¶18. (S) Documents exchanged:

U.S.:

- Charts Illustrating Comparative Elimination Requirements Under START, U.S. and Russian proposals for the Elimination Protocol;

- Unofficial Russian Translation of the U.S. Elimination Protocol; and

- U.S.-proposed Text for the Elimination Protocol
(Begin comment: Document will be provided in a SEPTEL. End comment.)

¶19. (S) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
Mr. Siemon
Lt Col Comeau
LTC Leyde
Lt Col Goodman
Mr. Dwyer
Mr. Strauss
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Hanchett
LCDR Brons
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Purcell
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Col Izrazov
Ms. Kotkova
Col Novikov
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Leontiev
Col Zaitsev
Col Ilin
Gen Venevtsev
Mr. Kostyuchenko
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

¶20. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
RICHTER